Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1993, Chang and Wu [5] introduced Remote password authentication scheme with smart cards. A number of remote password authentication schemes with smart cards have been proposed since then. These schemes allow a valid user to login a remote server and access the services provided by the remote server.
In 2000, Hwang and Li [7] proposed a new remote user authentication scheme using smart cards, which was based on ElGamal's cryptosystem. Chan and Cheng [2] made a cryptanalysis of Hwang and Li's Scheme and pointed out that a legitimate user can easily create a valid pair of (ID j , PW j ) without knowing the secrete key of the system 'x s '.
Later, Shen, Lin and Hwang [10] showed that a legitimate user can masquerade as another user. The user can compute some other user's password. They also proposed a modified scheme to patch up both 'Chen and Chang's attack' and their own attack. In the same year, Chang and Hwang [4] proposed an extended attack to solve the problem of Chan and Cheng's attack on Hwang and Li's authentication scheme.
Further Leung et al [9] showed that weakness still exists in Shen, Lin and Hwang's scheme. By using similar attack of Cheng' attack or Chang and Hwang's attack a legitimate user can still impersonate other legal users to login a remote server.
Recently Kumar [8] suggested the idea of check digits to repair the Shen et al's scheme, which successfully removes the threats devised by Leung et al. In the same year Awasthi and Lal [1] also proposed a scheme which also removes these threats successfully.
In this paper we propose a new remote user authentication scheme, which is more efficient than Kumar's scheme in terms of computational cost.
II. REVIEW OF THE HWNAG-LI SCHEME
In this section, we briefly review Hwang-Li scheme [5] . This scheme is composed of the initial phase, registration phase, the login phase and the authentication phase. Whenever a user registers itself through registration phase, the server identifies the user and issues a password and a smartcard, holding related information, through a secure channel. To access the remote server, user inserts its smart card in to the device and keys the password. The server authenticates the user in authentication phase. Different phases work as follows:
A. Initial Phase
The System Administrator (SA) generates the following parameters p : a large prime number h (.) : a one-way function x s : a secret key of the system B. Registration Phase A user U i who wants to register itself for accessing server services, submits it's ID i to the SA. SA computes PW i as
Registration center issues a password PW i and a smart card, which contains the public parameters (h (.), p ).
C. Login Phase
User U i inserts its smart-card and provides ID i and PW i . The smart card then does the following:
1. Generate a random number r.
D. Authentication Phase
The system receives the message C at time T', where T' is the current time of system. Then the system does the following steps:
1. Test the validity of ID i . 2. Test the validity of time interval between T and T '. 3. Check whether the following equation holds: 
B. Shen-Lin-Hwang's attack
According to this attack a legitimate user who wants to masquerade as another user U k may login a remote server and gain access.
Suppose Bob wants to masquerade as another user U k . He first computes ID b by ID b = ID k r mod p, where r is a random number such that gcd(r, p) = 1. Then, he submits his ID b to register with the remote server. SA will verify identity and provide a smart card and password
Now Bob can compute PW k as follow:
-r mod p As a result, Bob can successfully use user U k 's password to masquerade as the user U k to login the remote server.
C. Chang and Hwang's attack
Chang and Hwang pointed out that the Chan and Cheng's attack is not always success. Chan and Cheng did not consider the validity checking of ID i in the authentication phase of Hwang and Li's scheme and cannot guarantee that the specific format of the user identity always satisfies the square of a legitimate identity, that is, ID i mod p [3] . Chan and Hwang also designed two attack mechanisms to obtain a valid identity which is based on Chan and Chang's one.
I-Mechanism Following Chan and Chang' equation
where r is an arbitrary integer and the corresponding password can be obtained by:
is primitive element of the modulus p, any valid identity ID j as well as its password can be computed. And now any intruder with identity ID j successfully passes the validity check for identity in Hwang and Li's scheme.
II-Mechanism
Several intruders may cooperate to get a valid identity ID j as well as its corresponding password PW j as follows ID j = ∏ ID b mod p. Suppose identity fulfills the required format, its corresponding password can be obtained by:
IV. SHEN-LIN-HWANG'S MODIFICATION
Shen, Lin and Hwang proposed a modified scheme in [7] . They suggested that instead of an identity a shadow identity will be given to the legal user. The scheme has the just hiding of identities to prevent from the forgery attack [section III-B, III-C]. The steps in login and authentication phase are not changed except ID i is replaced by SID i . The modified registration phase is as follows:
User U i submits his ID i to the remote server for registration. The remote server computes the pair (SID i , PW i ) as follows:
is a shadow function, such that user cannot compute ID i having the knowledge of SID i and Red (.) . The shadow function is only maintained in the remote server. SID i is user's shadow identity which is made public instead of ID i . Registration center issues a shadow identity SID i , a password PW i and a smart card, which contains the public parameters (h (.), p ). In login phase and authentication phase each ID i is replaced with SID i . Login and authentication processes remain same. Now message C coming to server through login page is
According to Shen et al., Though shadow identity of ID i is known, shadow identity of
can not be computed. That is why this scheme is secure.
V. LEUNG-CHENG-FONG-CHAN'S OBJECTION
Leung, Cheng, Fong and Chan pointed out that although Shen et al. defend the attack of registration of a new ID j via ID i from a legal user U i , the scheme can not withstand attack that similar to Chan and Cheng's attack and Chang and Hwang's attack in authentication phase.
According to Leung et al, shadow identity does not enhance the security in authentication phase and hence intruder can still login to the remote system by having a pair (SID j , PW j ). Attack works as follows:
Replace ID j with SID j in Chang and Hwang's attack (mechanism-I), we get SID j = (SID b ) r mod p. where r is an arbitrary integer and the corresponding password can be obtained by:
This shows that a legitimate user ui can impersonate other legal user with valid pair (SID j , PW j ) to login the remote server. Note SID b is primitive element of the modulus p, any valid shadow identity SID j as well as its password can be computed. Similarly, chan-cheng's attack works fine.
VI. REVIEW OF THE KUMAR'S SCHEME
In this section, we briefly review Kumar's scheme [8] . This scheme is composed of the initial phase, registration phase, the login phase and the authentication phase.
This scheme is the modified form of the Shen-LinHwang's scheme and uses one more function C K to generate the check digit [6] for each registered identity. In this scheme, only the AS can generate a valid identity and the corresponding check digit.
A. Initialization Phase
In this phase, the AS generates the following parameters P : a large prime number. f : a one-way function.
x s : a secret key of the system, which is only possessed with the AS. Red (.): a "shadowed" identity of the device which is only possessed with the AS. C K (.): a one way secure check digit function, which is used to generate unique check digit for the registered identity, and also is possessed with the AS Only.
B. Registration Phase
Assume that this phase is executed over a secure channel. User U submits her/his identity string ID i to the AS. The string ID i consists of the name of the user and a unique identification number etc, which are unique for the user U. Then, AS computes the following:
Furthermore, the AS distributes the smart card and (S ID ID , PW) to the user U in a secure way (say physically). The smart card contains the public parameters (f, p).
C. Login Phase
The user U attaches her/his smart card to the smart card reader at any time T and keys her/his identity S ID ID and password PW. The smart card conducts the following computations:
Computes C 1 = (S ID )
r mod p.
D. Authentication Phase
Assume that the AS receives the login request L R at time T c . Then, AS does the following computations to check the validity of the login request L R . )(S ID ) f (T ⊕ PW) mod p, then the AS accepts the login request. Otherwise, the login request will be rejected by AS.
VII. A NEW REMOTE USER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME USING SMART CARDS WITH CHECK DIGITS
In this section, we propose our new remote user authentication scheme. This scheme is also composed of the initial phase, registration phase, the login phase and the authentication phase.
This scheme is the modified form of the Hwnag-Li's scheme and uses one more function C K to generate the check digit [8] for each registered identity. In this scheme, only the AS can generate a valid identity and the corresponding check digit.
A. Initialization Phase
The System Administrator (SA) generates the following parameters p : a large prime number f (.) : A one-way function x s : a secret key of the system C K (.): :a "function" to generate check digit for the registered identity, which is only possessed with the AS.
B. Registration Phase
A user U i who wants to register itself for accessing server services, submits it's ID i to the SA. SA assigns a unique registration number R and computes PW i as
Registration center issues a password PW i and a smart card, which contains the public parameters (h (.), p, R, C ID ).
C. Login Phase
The user U attaches its smart card to the smart card reader at any time T and keys the identity ID i and password PW i . The smart card computes as foloowing:
Computes
C 1 = (ID i ⊕ R) r mod p. 3. Compute t = f (T ⊕ PW i ) mod p -1. 4. Compute m = (ID i ) t mod p. 5. Compute C 2 = m (PW i ) r mod p. 6. Sends a message C = (ID i , R, C ID , C 1 , C 2 , T ) to the AS.
D. Authentication Phase
1. 
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEME
In this section, we shall only discuss the enhanced security features. Rests are the same as original schemes in literature.
A. Chan-Cheng's attack and Chang-Hwang's Attack
The security explanation is very similar to Kumar's discussion. The functionality of the C K (.) blocks the attacks via authentication phase as in Chan-Cheng's attack and Chang-Hwang's Attack. Assume, Alice chooses a R' such that
where k is a random number.
Then, he can compute the corresponding password PW b = PW i k mod p. But, this result is incomplete; still, it is essential to obtain the check digit corresponding to ID b . In the proposed scheme only the SA can generate the check digit corresponding to ID b and R'. As a result, a legal user ID i cannot compute a valid pair of identity and password for the other user ID b to login at the server. Thus, Chang-Hwang's Attack will not work. As being the one of the case of this attack, Chan-Cheng's attack also does not work.
A. Shen-Lin-Hwang's attack
The functionality of the assignment of registration number blocks the masquerade attack via registration phase. Assume that an intruder intercepts the logon request C = (ID i, C ID , C 1 , C 2 , T c ) from a public network and computes we are not using shadow function so there is no need to discuss this attack.
IX. COMPARISON
In this section we compare the computational cost of our scheme with other schemes. Let us denote E as computational cost of an exponential operation, H as cost of hashing, M cost of multiplication, R is cost of redirection function (It is approximately hashing cost) and C as Check digit counting cost. Since R and C both functions are equivalent to hash function, we can not neglect their computational cost. Other costs are negligible or minor. Then following table shows the computational cost in various phases in terms of these costs. Above table shows that our proposed scheme bears a less redirection cost in registration phase than Kumar's scheme and holds similar security level.
X. COMPARISON
This paper presents New Remote User Authentication Scheme Using Smart Cards with check digits. This scheme is more efficient than Kumar's scheme. The proposed scheme is secure against the both types of attacks: attacks via registration phase and the attack via authentication phase. One enhanced feature of this scheme is that more than one user with same identity may register to the server.
